By Kim Won-soo
The summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and his Korean counterpart Yoon Suk-yeol took place merely a dozen days following President Yoon's inauguration. Some may think it was a natural prelude to the Quad summit in Japan. But the symbolism attached to it cannot be overlooked. As the first stop in his very first presidential trip to Asia, there is more to President Biden's visit to Korea than meets the eye.
Over the seven decades since the Korean War, the Korea-U.S. alliance has evolved significantly, reflecting both changes in international geopolitics and the rise of Korea from a war-stricken, impoverished country to one of the world's most advanced economies.
I would argue the alliance has now entered a third phase: the first phase (1.0) saw South Korea significantly dependent upon the United States from 1953 to the late 1980s while the second phase (2.0) showed a more balanced partnership between the two with a particular focus on the Korean Peninsula from the 1990s until early this year.
Last year's joint statement issued by former President Moon Jae-in and President Biden depicted Korea-U.S. relations as a "comprehensive partnership." This time it was upgraded to a "global comprehensive strategic partnership." The alliance 3.0 is a more mature relationship with global interests beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Thanks to the great work done by the two presidents, the Korea-U.S. alliance has been rebooted. But that was the easy part compared to the challenges expected to arise in the years ahead. The hard part is yet to come.
Here are the three challenges that will require our most urgent attention. They are listed in descending order of difficulty.
First and foremost comes China. China was the odd man out in President Biden's visit to Asia. Most striking in the joint statement issued after the summit was the omission of any references to China. Ironically, the omission rather highlights the importance of China for President Biden. Of course, Beijing reacted negatively to his visit. Managing China's reactions and shielding Korean businesses from the potential fallout will be the most immediate and challenging task for the Yoon government.
Second, while the joint statement frequently brought up the North Korea threat, it failed to grab much attention from the media due to both the inertia from the prolonged stalemate and the increased predictability of Pyongyang's provocations. North Korea may intend to bide its time before deciding on the next course of action vis-a-vis the Yoon government. Or North Korea may well be preoccupied with the sudden spread of the coronavirus which is estimated to be far beyond their response capability.
Nevertheless, President Biden's visit produced several policy changes that would likely upset North Korea, including the resumption of Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and the decision not to mention in the joint statement of the inter-Korean and the U.S.-North Korea summits that took place during the Moon government.
North Korea could resort to further provocations to express its disapproval. Responding to Pyongyang's provocations will become increasingly difficult for South Korea, as China, North Korea's main patron, is expected to be less forthcoming toward the U.S. and South Korea.
Third, South Korea's relationship with Japan needs to be repaired. Given the sensitivity of the issues involved, improving Korea-Japan relations will require domestic political heavy-lifting on both sides. Relatively speaking, this will be much easier to manage than the other challenges with China and North Korea. This should be done as quickly as possible, as it will help both South Korea and Japan strengthen their trilateral coordination with the U.S. in dealing with future contingencies in the region.
Additionally, South Korea urgently needs to prepare for two likely sources of friction. First, the South Korean government needs to make it clear to Beijing that it desires an open, inclusive, and rules-based future for the Indo-Pacific region. Especially, the rationale for its decision to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework must be explained clearly: It would be far more beneficial to shape the rule building at the start of the IPEF than joining it later once the rules have been set by others.
Second, various channels of communication with North Korea, including the hotline, must remain open at all times. As a first step to confidence building, South Korea could make a compelling offer of medical assistance to North Korea.
South Korea can also urge the U.S. to reopen the dialogue with China so that they can manage contingencies and explore common ground on the issues of mutual concern such as climate change and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.
Korean diplomacy stands at a tipping point. The next five years will be critical for the future of the Korean Peninsula and the region. In that regard, President Biden's early visit to Korea marks an important and promising beginning to a renewed Korea-U.S. relationship. As a result of the summit, the Korea-U.S. alliance 3.0 is getting started as a value-based global partnership.
Translating the shared vision for the alliance 3.0 into reality will inevitably come with a number of hurdles in global and regional politics. Overcoming those hurdles requires creative thinking and consistent diplomacy. The wisdom of the South Korean government is called for now more than ever.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs as well as for international security. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Taejae Academy (Future Consensus Institute) and the chair professor of the Kyung Hee University.
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Over the seven decades since the Korean War, the Korea-U.S. alliance has evolved significantly, reflecting both changes in international geopolitics and the rise of Korea from a war-stricken, impoverished country to one of the world's most advanced economies.
I would argue the alliance has now entered a third phase: the first phase (1.0) saw South Korea significantly dependent upon the United States from 1953 to the late 1980s while the second phase (2.0) showed a more balanced partnership between the two with a particular focus on the Korean Peninsula from the 1990s until early this year.
Last year's joint statement issued by former President Moon Jae-in and President Biden depicted Korea-U.S. relations as a "comprehensive partnership." This time it was upgraded to a "global comprehensive strategic partnership." The alliance 3.0 is a more mature relationship with global interests beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Thanks to the great work done by the two presidents, the Korea-U.S. alliance has been rebooted. But that was the easy part compared to the challenges expected to arise in the years ahead. The hard part is yet to come.
Here are the three challenges that will require our most urgent attention. They are listed in descending order of difficulty.
First and foremost comes China. China was the odd man out in President Biden's visit to Asia. Most striking in the joint statement issued after the summit was the omission of any references to China. Ironically, the omission rather highlights the importance of China for President Biden. Of course, Beijing reacted negatively to his visit. Managing China's reactions and shielding Korean businesses from the potential fallout will be the most immediate and challenging task for the Yoon government.
Second, while the joint statement frequently brought up the North Korea threat, it failed to grab much attention from the media due to both the inertia from the prolonged stalemate and the increased predictability of Pyongyang's provocations. North Korea may intend to bide its time before deciding on the next course of action vis-a-vis the Yoon government. Or North Korea may well be preoccupied with the sudden spread of the coronavirus which is estimated to be far beyond their response capability.
Nevertheless, President Biden's visit produced several policy changes that would likely upset North Korea, including the resumption of Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and the decision not to mention in the joint statement of the inter-Korean and the U.S.-North Korea summits that took place during the Moon government.
North Korea could resort to further provocations to express its disapproval. Responding to Pyongyang's provocations will become increasingly difficult for South Korea, as China, North Korea's main patron, is expected to be less forthcoming toward the U.S. and South Korea.
Third, South Korea's relationship with Japan needs to be repaired. Given the sensitivity of the issues involved, improving Korea-Japan relations will require domestic political heavy-lifting on both sides. Relatively speaking, this will be much easier to manage than the other challenges with China and North Korea. This should be done as quickly as possible, as it will help both South Korea and Japan strengthen their trilateral coordination with the U.S. in dealing with future contingencies in the region.
Additionally, South Korea urgently needs to prepare for two likely sources of friction. First, the South Korean government needs to make it clear to Beijing that it desires an open, inclusive, and rules-based future for the Indo-Pacific region. Especially, the rationale for its decision to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework must be explained clearly: It would be far more beneficial to shape the rule building at the start of the IPEF than joining it later once the rules have been set by others.
Second, various channels of communication with North Korea, including the hotline, must remain open at all times. As a first step to confidence building, South Korea could make a compelling offer of medical assistance to North Korea.
South Korea can also urge the U.S. to reopen the dialogue with China so that they can manage contingencies and explore common ground on the issues of mutual concern such as climate change and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.
Korean diplomacy stands at a tipping point. The next five years will be critical for the future of the Korean Peninsula and the region. In that regard, President Biden's early visit to Korea marks an important and promising beginning to a renewed Korea-U.S. relationship. As a result of the summit, the Korea-U.S. alliance 3.0 is getting started as a value-based global partnership.
Translating the shared vision for the alliance 3.0 into reality will inevitably come with a number of hurdles in global and regional politics. Overcoming those hurdles requires creative thinking and consistent diplomacy. The wisdom of the South Korean government is called for now more than ever.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs as well as for international security. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Taejae Academy (Future Consensus Institute) and the chair professor of the Kyung Hee University.
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